The Incentives that Shape Behaviour by Carey, Ryan et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
07
11
8v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 20
 Ja
n 2
02
0
The Incentives that Shape Behaviour
Ryan Carey∗
University of Oxford
ry.duff@gmail.com
Eric Langlois∗
DeepMind
University of Toronto
Vector Institute
edl@cs.toronto.edu
Tom Everitt
DeepMind
tomeveritt@google.com
Shane Legg
DeepMind
Abstract
Which variables does an agent have an incentive
to control with its decision, and which variables
does it have an incentive to respond to? We for-
malize these incentives, and demonstrate unique
graphical criteria for detecting them in any single-
decision causal influence diagram. To this end, we
introduce structural causal influence models, a hy-
brid of the influence diagram and structural causal
model frameworks. Finally, we illustrate how these
incentives predict agent incentives in both fairness
and AI safety applications.
1 Introduction
Incentives are a useful language for analysing the be-
haviour of humans and artificial agents. For example:
• A chess player (or chess-playing AI) often has an
incentive to capture its opponent’s queen.
• A pilot (or autopilot) has an incentive to move to
a safe altitude.
• A walking human (or humanoid robot) has an in-
centive to pay attention to obstacles on the ground.
When modelling these human or artificial agents, in-
centive analysis allows us to (imperfectly) predict an
agent’s behaviour without knowing its implementation
details, but just assuming that it is “smart enough” to
do what will help it to attain its goals. What causes
goal-attainment in one environment will not necessarily
do so in another: a safe altitude is not the same for an
aeroplane as for a helicopter. So to talk about incentives
precisely, it is useful to describe them with reference to
an environment with a specific causal structure.1
In order to discuss incentives consistently, a critical
step is to formally describe them. In the setting of a
causal influence diagram, Everitt et al. (2019b) define
two types of incentives: intervention incentives and ob-
servation incentives. An intervention incentive is present
for a variable X if the agent can obtain more utility
given the ability to arbitrarily manipulate the variable
∗Equal contribution
1In fact, Miller et al. (2019) argue that it is impossible
to infer incentives without causal assumptions.
— i.e. the value of control of X is greater than zero
(Matheson, 1990). An observation incentive is present
for a variable X if the agent can obtain more utility if it
is allowed to observe X before making a decision than if
it cannot — i.e. the value of information of X is greater
than zero (Howard, 1966). Usefully, Everitt et al. also
provide sound and complete criteria for the presence
of intervention and observation incentives in single-
decision influence diagrams, which have been used in
fairness and AI safety analyses (Cohen et al., 2020;
Everitt et al., 2019a,b; Everitt and Hutter, 2019).
However, the analysis of Everitt et al. (2019b) has
one shortcoming: it defines incentives so as to include
events that an agent cannot feasibly achieve. For exam-
ple, a chess-playing AI would always have an interven-
tion incentive on its opponent’s immediate resignation,
even if it had no way to bring about that outcome. A pi-
lot would have an observation incentive for its altitude
even if the altitude sensors are irreparably broken. As
such, the incentives described by Everitt et al. (2019b)
overstate the incentives shaping an agent’s policy.
This paper aims to characterize the incentives that
shape the agent’s decisions. To this end, we present a
new framework that combines the best elements from
(causal) influence diagrams and structural causal mod-
els (Section 2). Using this framework, we define con-
trol incentives and response incentives, and demonstrate
unique (Sections 3 and 4). We also illustrate how con-
trol and response incentives can illuminate fairness and
manipulation issues (Section 5). Finally, we review re-
lated work (Section 6), and conclude (Section 7).
2 Setup
2.1 Structural Causal Models
In this section, we recap structural causal models
(SCMs), a main building block of our theory. An SCM
is a type of causal model where all randomness is con-
signed to exogenous variables. The variables of interest
(called endogenous variables) are all deterministic func-
tions of each other and the exogenous variables.
Definition 1 (Structural causal model; Pearl, 2009,
Chapter 7). A structural causal model (with indepen-
dent errors) is a tuple M = 〈E,V ,F , P 〉 where:
1
LA
T
EL
EA
ET
Lecture online
L = fL(EL)
Attendance
A = fA(L, EA)
Test performance
T = fT (L, A, ET )
(a) Whether the lecture is put online or
not is represented by L. An online lec-
ture has a positive direct effect on test
performance (T ), but also a negative in-
direct effect as it reduces class atten-
dance (A).
l
Al
Tl
EL
EA
ET
Lecture online
l = online
Attendance
Al = fA(l, EA)
Test performance
Tl = fT (l, Al, ET )
(b) The effect of putting the lec-
ture online do(L = l) is reflected
in the potential responses Al and
Tl for attendance and test perfor-
mance.
L
A
T
EL
EA
ET
l
Al
TAl
Lecture online
l = online
Attendance
Al = fA(l, EA)
Test performance
TAl = fT (L, Al, ET )
(c) The nested potential response TAl is the
test performance that would result if lecture
online took its true value L (not online, say)
but attendance was Al, i.e. as if the lecture
was online.
Figure 1: An example of a structural causal model (a) with (nested) potential responses (b,c), which can be used to
describe a wide range of hypothetical events.
• V is a set of structural variables with finite do-
mains.
• E = {EV }V ∈V is a set of finite-domain exogenous
variables, one for each structural variable.
• F = {fV }V ∈V , fV : dom(PaV ∪ {EV })→ dom(V )
is a set of structural functions that specify the
value of each variable in terms of the correspond-
ing exogenous variable EV and structural parents,
PaV ⊂ V , where these functional dependencies are
acyclic. Here, dom(V ) denotes the domain of a vari-
able V and dom(W ) =×W∈W dom(W ) denotes
the domain of a set of variables W .
• P is a probability distribution for E such that the
individual exogenous variables EV are mutually in-
dependent.
An SCM defines a probability distribution over its
variables. For any values E = ε of the exogenous vari-
ables, the value of any set of variables W ⊆ V is given
by recursive application of the structural functions F
and is denoted by W (ε). Combined with the distribu-
tion P (ε) on the exogenous variables, this induces a
joint distribution Pr(W = w) =
∑
{ε|W (ε)=w} P (ε).
As an illustration, we model the effects of putting a
lecture online in Figure 1a. We will use this example
throughout the paper to illustrate concepts as we intro-
duce them.
An SCM supports causal interventions that set vari-
ables to particular values while breaking the functional
dependencies of those variables on their parents. These
are defined via submodels:
Definition 2 (Submodel; Pearl, 2009, Chapter 7). Let
M = 〈E ,V ,F , P 〉 be an SCM, X a set of variables in
V , and x a particular realization of X. The submodel
Mx represents the effects of an intervention do(X = x),
and is formally defined as the SCM 〈E ,V ,Fx, P 〉 where
Fx = {fV |V /∈X} ∪ {X = x}. That is to say, the origi-
nal functional relationships of X ∈X are replaced with
the constant functions X = x.
If W is a random variable in an SCM M , then Wx
refers to the same random variable in the submodelMx.
Wx is called a potential response variable, as it repre-
sents the hypothetical value that W would take under
an intervention do(X = x). Potential response variables
are illustrated in Figure 1b.
More elaborate hypotheticals can be described with
nested potential responses, in which the intervention is
itself a potential response variable. For example, in our
running example, we may want to consider the value
of test performance T if the effect of setting the lec-
ture online, do(L = l), is propagated only through at-
tendance A. This hypothetical quantity is represented
with the nested potential response TAl , as illustrated
in Figure 1c. Formally, for arbitrary variables X,Y, Z,
XYz is the random variable XYz(ε)(ε) for ε ∼ E .
2.2 Structural Causal Influence Models
To describe incentives, we will need other types of
variables: “utility” and “decision” nodes that are not
present in structural causal models. A causal influence
diagram is a graphical representation of a decision-
making problem that contains a decision-maker whose
goal is to maximize summed expected utility (see
Figure 2).
Definition 3 (Causal Influence Diagram (CID)). A
causal influence diagram is a directed acyclic graph G
where the vertex set V is partitioned into structure
nodes X, decision nodes D, and utility nodes U . The
utility nodes have no children.
We use PaGV , Ch
G
V , Anc
G
V , Desc
G
V respectively to de-
note the parents, children, ancestors and descendants of
a node V in V . For a decision D, we call PaGD the deci-
sion context of D. We use FaGV := {V }∪Pa
G
V to denote
the family of V . When the graph is obvious from con-
text the superscript is omitted. An edge from node X
to node Y is denoted X → Y , a directed path (of length
at least zero) is denoted X 99K Y , and an undirected
2
DA
U
ED
EA
EU
Lecture online
Attendance
A = fA(D, EA)
Test performance
U = fU (D, A, EU )
exogenous
node
deterministic
node
decision node
utility node
causal link
Figure 2: A structural causal influence model displaying
a lecturer’s decision regarding how to choose whether to
place a lecture online (D) given its direct and indirect
effects on students’ test performance (U). A policy D =
pi(ED) specifies the missing structural function for the
decision node.
path by X -- Y . For sets of variables, X 99K Y means
that X 99K Y holds for some X ∈X, Y ∈ Y .
In order to model specific decision scenarios, we need
to augment the influence diagram with specific func-
tions and probability distributions (sometimes called
a “realization” of the diagram). To do this we intro-
duce the structural causal influence model (SCIM, pro-
nounced ‘skim’), a generalization of SCMs to causal in-
fluence diagrams. A SCIM specifies the value of each
CID variable as a deterministic function of its parents
and an additional set of exogenous variables and sup-
ports potential response inference via the structural
causal model.
SCIMs were anticipated by functional influence di-
agrams (Dawid, 2002) and Howard canonical form
(Heckerman and Shachter, 1995), as discussed further
in Section 6.
Definition 4 (Structural causal influence model
(SCIM)). A structural causal influence model is a tu-
ple M = 〈G,E ,F , P 〉 where:
• G is a causal influence diagram on a set of variables
V (partitioned into X, D, and U) with finite do-
mains where utility variable domains are a subset
of R. We say that that M is compatible with G.
• E = {EV }V ∈V is a set of finite-domain exogenous
variables, one for each structural variable.
• F = {fV }V ∈V , fV : dom(PaV ∪ {EV })→ dom(V )
is a set of structural functions that specify the value
of each structure and utility variable in terms of the
values of its parents.
• P is a probability distribution for E such that the
individual exogenous variables EV are mutually in-
dependent.
A single-decision SCIM has |D| = 1. For the present
work, incentive definitions will be restricted to this case
and we take D to be the unique element of D.
For example, we can view the lecturing problem from
Figure 1a as a decision-making problem for the lecturer,
using a SCIM as in Figure 2.
Lecture
online
Attendance
Test
performance
Graduate
class
Paper
reviews
Student
illness
control incentive
causal link
Figure 3: An extended version of the lecture example
labeled with control incentives. Attendance and test-
performance are both feasible and desirable to control.
Although student illness and the number of graduate
students also affect attendance, they are not down-
stream of any decisions and therefore lack a control
incentive. The lecturer knows the reviews of their re-
cent paper but controlling the paper reviews is neither
possible nor useful for improving test performance. It
therefore lacks a control incentive as well.
Definition 5 (Policy). A policy for a decision D in a
SCIM is a function piD : dom(PaD ∪ {ED})→ dom(D).
When we specify the policy of a decision variable,
it becomes a structural variable and a single-decision
SCIM becomes an SCM. For a policy pi, Mpi is defined
as the SCM 〈E ,V ,F ∪ {pi}, P 〉. We use Prpi and Epi to
denote probabilities and expectations with respect to
Mpi. When X is a set of variables that do not descend
from D, then Prpi(x) is independent of pi and we simply
write Pr(x). With this, we can define an optimal pol-
icy for a SCIM as any policy pi that maximizes Epi[U ],
where U :=
∑
U∈U U . As with variables in the model, a
potential response Ux of U is defined with respect to its
value in the submodel Mx.
3 Control incentives
This section and the next define two types of incen-
tives in terms of expected utility and potential re-
sponses in a structural causal model. The sections also
establish graphical criteria for detecting possible con-
trol incentives directly from a causal influence diagram.
These incentive definitions are compared against those
of Everitt et al. (2019b) in Table 1.
3.1 Definition
This section asks which variables a decision-maker
would use its decision to control. We approach the ques-
tion of how to define these control incentives in two
steps, using the context of our running example to aid
intuition (Figure 3).
First, suppose the lecturer was magically given the
ability to control a variable X . Would they want to use
it?2 The answer is that it is advantageous for an agent to
2This is the question of intervention incentives, explored
3
Incentive Expected Utility Definition Graphical Criterion
Intervention (old) ∃gX : maxpi Epi [U ] < maxpi,x Epi [UgX ] exists path X 99K U in the reduced graph
Control (new) ∀pi∗ ∃paD, d : Epi∗ [U|paD] 6= Epi∗ [UXd |paD] exists path D 99K X 99K U
Observation (old) maxpi∈Π− Epi[U ] < maxpi∈Π+ Epi [U ] X 6⊥ U | FaD \ {X}, U ∈ Desc(D)
Response (new) ∀pi∗ ∃x, ε : D(ε) 6= Dx(ε) in Mpi∗ exists path X 99KW → D 99K U
and W 6⊥ U | FaD \ {W}
Table 1: Comparison of control and response incentives with intervention and observation incentives from Everitt et al.
(2019b). A diagram is “compatible with” the incentive in the left column on a variable X if and only if the node for X
matches the graphical criterion in the right column. In the expected utility definitions, pi∗ denotes an optimal policy,
gX : dom(PaX)→ dom(X) is a soft intervention replaces the structural function f
X inM, Π−i is the set of policies
that do not depend on X , and Π+ is the set of policies that can depend on X . A reduced graph, per Everitt et al.,
is a graph that is modified by removing edges from decision parents that lack an observation incentive.
control X if X influences its utility, or, more formally, if
there is an intervention x on X such that Ux > U . Here
Ux represents the utility attained under intervention x,
and U the baseline utility attained without an interven-
tion. In fact, the lecturer could benefit from magically
intervening on any of the nodes in Figure 3. In contrast,
an agent can never gain utility from intervening on a
node X if there exists no directed path X 99K U .
The lecturer, however, does not have magical abilities,
and can only affect variablesX through their decisionD.
It is necessary, therefore, to consider the ways D can af-
fect X , formally represented by the potential response
Xd. When there is no directed path D 99K X , then
Xd = X , which means that the decision cannot influ-
ence X . For example, the lecturer in Figure 3 is unable
to control whether the students are sick or the number
of graduate students in their class, but they can control
the attendance by (not) putting the lecture online.
Putting these components together, the nested poten-
tial response UXd represents how U is influenced by D
via the variable X . To a first approximation, if UXd 6= U
for some decision d, then the agent can benefit from
controlling X (or lose utility from losing the ability to
control X).
Definition 6 (Control Incentive). Let M be a single-
decision SCIM. There is a control incentive on a vari-
able X ∈ V in M if, for every optimal policy pi∗,
there exists a decision context paD with Pr(paD) > 0
and an alternative decision d ∈ dom(D) such that
Epi∗ [UXd | paD] 6= Epi∗ [U | paD].
3
We say that a CID G is compatible with a control
incentive on X if G is compatible with a SCIM M that
has a control incentive on X .
in detail by Everitt et al. (2019b). See Table 1 for a compar-
ison of control and intervention incentives.
3For those familiar with causal mediation, this is equiva-
lent to the statement that under all optimal policies there ex-
ists an alternative decision in some decision context that has
a nonzero average natural indirect effect on utility through
X (Robins and Greenland, 1992; Pearl, 2001).
3.2 Graphical criterion
The following theorem establishes a graphical criterion
for detecting whether a causal influence diagram is com-
patible with a control incentive on a given variable
X . Figure 3 illustrates the application of the theorem,
showing how it predicts control incentives for test result
and class attendance, but not for student illness.
Theorem 7 (Control Incentive Graphical Crierion). A
single-decision causal influence diagram G is compatible
with a control incentive on X ∈ V if and only if G has
a directed path from the decision D to a utility node
U ∈ U that passes through X, i.e. has a path of the
form D 99K X 99K U .
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 19 and 20 in Appendix A.
4 Response incentive
Assume a decision is made to optimize expected utility.
Which changes in the world does the decision have both
ability and interest in responding to? This is the moti-
vating question behind response incentives. First, we
will give an expected utility definition of response in-
centives, then we will establish a criterion for detecting
response incentives directly from a graphical represen-
tation.
4.1 Definition
Variables with a response incentive are ones that an opti-
mal policy must be causally responsive to. The decision
value selected by a policy in response to an intervention
do(X = x) is the potential response Dx. Formally, we
ask whether, for every optimal policy, there is some Dx
that differs from the natural decision distribution D.
Definition 8 (Response Incentive). LetM be a single-
decision SCIM. There is a response incentive on a vari-
able X ∈ X if for every optimal policy pi∗, there exists
some intervention do(X = x) and some setting E = ε,
such that Dx(ε) 6= D(ε) in Mpi∗ .
4
Lecture
online
Attendance
Test
performance
Graduate
class
Paper
reviews
Student
illness
response incentive
Figure 4: The lecture example from Figure 3 labelled
with response incentives. There is both a means, and a
reason to let the number of graduate students influence
the decision whether to put the lecture online, so this
variable has a response incentive. In contrast, the lec-
turer has no incentive to take into account the recent
paper reviews for the decision. Whether students get ill
would be of interest, but cannot be known in advance.
Therefore both student illness and paper reviews lack a
response incentive.
A CID G is compatible with a response incentive on X
if there exists a compatible SCIM that has a response
incentive on X .
4.2 Graphical criterion
Just as for control incentives, there is a graphical crite-
rion for detecting whether a given causal influence dia-
gram is compatible with a response incentive to some
node X . The graphical criterion makes use of the stan-
dard notion of d-separation (Pearl, 2009).
Definition 9 (d-separation). A path p is said to be
d-separated by a set of nodes Z if and only if
1. p contains a chain X →W → Y or a fork
X ←W → Y such that W is in Z, or
2. p contains a collider X →W ← Y such that the
middle node W is not in Z and such that no de-
scendant of W is in Z.
A set Z is said to d-separate X from Y , written
(X ⊥ Y | Z) if and only if Z d-separates every path
from a node in X to a node in Y . Sets that are not
d-separated are called d-connected.
Theorem 10 (Response Incentive Graphical Criterion).
A single-decision causal influence diagram G is compat-
ible with a response incentive on X ∈ X if and only
if
1. there is a directed path from X to an observation
W ∈ PaD,
2. there is a directed path from D to a utility variable
U , and
3. W is d-connected to U given the remaining FaD,
i.e. W 6⊥ U | FaD \ {W}.
The conditions of the theorem ensure that changes to
X must be able to influence an observation W (condi-
tion 1.) that all optimal policies must depend on (con-
ditions 2. and 3.). The proof follows from Lemmas 21
and 22 in Appendix A.
5 Applications
This section shows how the results developed in
Sections 3 and 4 relate to fairness and AI safety.
5.1 Incentivized unfairness
Fairness is a growing concern of machine learning sys-
tems making life-impacting decisions (O’Neill, 2016).
One formal interpretation of fairness is counterfactual
fairness, which requires decisions not to be causally re-
sponsive to protected attributes such as race or gender.
Definition 11 (Counterfactual fairness; Kusner et al.,
2017). A policy pi is counterfactually fair with respect
to a protected attribute A if4
Prpi (Da′ = d | paD, a) = Prpi (D = d | paD, a) (1)
for every decision d ∈ dom(D), every context paD ∈
dom(PaD), and every pair of attributes a, a
′ ∈ dom(A)
with Pr(paD, a) > 0.
Kusner et al. (2017, Lemma 1) establish that a deci-
sion can only be unfair if the protected attribute is an
ancestor of the decision. For example, consider a toy
example in which a classifier predicts the likelihood of
a car accident (Figure 5). In this scenario, the predic-
tor can be unfair with respect to marital status or race,
which are ancestors of the decision, but not age, which
is not.
Kusner et al.’s Lemma 1 only indicates whether
counterfactual fairness is possible, not whether it is
incentivized. The latter question is determined by
the response incentive to the protected attribute,
as established by the following theorem (proven in
Appendix A.3).
Theorem 12 (Counterfactual fairness and response in-
centives). There exists an optimal policy pi∗ that is coun-
terfactually fair with respect to a protected attribute A
if and only if there is no response incentive on A.
Using Theorem 12, we can use the graphical criterion
for response incentives (Theorem 10) to rule out incen-
tives for counterfactual unfairness.
• First, age is ruled out, because age is not an ances-
tor of accident prediction.
4To compute counterfactual probabilities on the left-
hand-side, we first “abduct” (update the E-distribution
based on paD and a), and then “act” (intervene with do(A =
a′)) (Pearl, 2009, Ch. 7). The question at hand is whether
the “act” step changes the distribution over the decision D.
The protected attribute A may or may not be part of PaD.
5
Accident
prediction
AccuracyResidential
address
Race
Recorded
accident
AccidentAge
Marital
Status
response incentive
observation incentive
Figure 5: A toy example for how a car accident risk-
estimator may come to make unfair decisions based on
race. In this hypothetical, we consider that one of the
protected attributes, age, affects accident rates. We as-
sume that race affects residential address, which affects
the rates of recorded accidents, but not the rates of ac-
cidents themselves. We assume that marital status does
not affect any of these. Lastly, we assume that only mari-
tal status and residential address are available to the sys-
tem. Since race influences residential area in this model,
this may inadvertently create a (potentially unfair) re-
sponse incentive for race. (For ease of comparison, we
also illustrate observation incentives in gray.)
• More interestingly, perhaps, there can be no in-
centive to be counterfactually unfair to marital
status, because the family of accident prediction
d-separates marital status from accuracy. So al-
though counterfactual unfairness regarding marital
status is possible in Figure 5, an optimal predictor
can be blind to marital status.
Thus, the only protected attribute that there can be an
incentive to respond to is race.
Beyond counterfactual fairness. Counterfactual
fairness has been criticized as being too liberal in deem-
ing decisions unfair, when the effect of the protected
attribute on the decision is mediated by a resolving vari-
able (Kilbertus et al., 2017). For example, one might ar-
gue that the influence of race on accident prediction in
Figure 5 is unproblematic, since it is mediated by res-
idential address, which is a reasonable feature to use
in predicting accident risk. Path-specific counterfactual
fairness refines counterfactual fairness, by considering
a decision unfair only if the protected attribute affects
the decision along an unfair pathway (Chiappa, 2019;
Chiappa and Isaac, 2019). A path-specific version of a
response incentive is left to future work.
Everitt et al. (2019b) propose an alternative to man-
ually specifying which paths are fair and not. They pro-
pose a graphical criterion called the observation incen-
tive criterion to detect whether a classifier has an incen-
tive to infer a protected attribute, and argue that if a
classifier lacks an incentive to infer a protected attribute,
then it lacks an incentive for disparate treatment of that
attribute. (Indicated with grey in Figure 5.) The obser-
vation incentive criterion may be combined with the re-
sponse incentive criterion. The combined criterion says
control incentive
Posts
to show
Model of
original opinions
Original
user opinions
Clicks
Influenced
user opinions
(a) Control incentive on user opinion.
Posts
to show
Model of
original opinions
Original
user opinions
Predicted
Clicks
Influenced
user opinions
(b) No control incentive on user opinion.
Figure 6: A social media content-selecting algorithm op-
timizes clicks, which leads to a control incentive for the
user’s opinion (a). This can be avoided with a change
to the objective (b).
that a decision lacks unfairness incentives unless it has
both an observation incentive and a response incentive
for a protected attribute. This would imply that the
decision problem in Figure 5 lacks unfair incentives, be-
cause race and marital status have no observation in-
centive, while race and age have no response incentive.
Note that the combined criterion is more specific than
either one alone, because only response incentives ex-
clude unfair incentives towards age, and only observa-
tion incentives rule out unfair incentives towards race.
Taking a step back, the virtue of an incentive-based
approach to fairness is that rather than evaluating the
fairness of individual trained models, we can analyze
whether a whole training regime (or class of training
regimes) is likely to give rise to unfair models.
5.2 Controlling a user’s preferences
A worry in AI safety (Russell, 2019) is that systems will
find a way to manipulate their objective, in order to get
more reward. This can be viewed as a type of control
incentive (Everitt and Hutter, 2019). In the context of
“filter bubbles” in social media, Stuart Russell says “Re-
inforcement learning changes the state of the world to
maximize the reward. The state of the world in this case
is your brain . . . [so] it changes you in a way that makes
you more predictable so that it can then send you stuff
that it knows you’re going to click on.” (Brand et al.,
2019).
This dynamic is modelled in Figure 6a. Here the
target of the content-selecting algorithm is to maxi-
mize user clicks over some time window, and these
clicks depend on the influenced user opinions. From
the diagram and the graphical control incentive crite-
6
rion (Theorem 7), we see that the content-selecting al-
gorithm may have a control incentive for user opinion.
For example, it may be easier to predict what content
a more emotional user will click on and thereby achieve
a higher click rate.
How could one design a content-selecting algorithm
without such an incentive? The control incentive on user
opinion relies on two things: (1) that the selected con-
tent influences user opinion, and (2) that the updated
user opinion influences the objective of the content-
selecting algorithm (i.e. the clicks). While there is not
much we can do about (1), we can change the objec-
tive of the content-selecting algorithm. As shown in
Figure 6b, we could redesign the system so that instead
of being reward for the true click rate, it is rewarded
for the predicted clicks on posts based on a model of
the original user opinions. An agent trained in this way
would view any modification of user opinions as irrele-
vant for improving its performance.
To work in practice, the click prediction must not it-
self include the effect of user opinion modification. We
might accomplish this by using a prediction model that
assumes independence between posts, or one that is
learned by only showing one post to each user. This
speaks to an important consideration when reasoning
about incentives: the lack of an incentive on a variable
is only practically meaningful if none of the variables
act as “proxies” for one another. Otherwise, a control
incentive on some variable X might systematically in-
duce the same kinds of decisions that a control incentive
on another variable Y would induce, even if there is no
control incentive on Y .
Similarly to the fairness setting, we see here how an
incentive analysis can be used to find training regimes
that are likely to generate models with desirable proper-
ties. Everitt and Hutter (2019) provide a more detailed
discussion of how to avoid undesirable control incen-
tives.
6 Related Work
In this section, we will review related work on (1) AI
safety, (2) incentive analysis in influence diagrams, as
well as (3) the relationship between influence diagrams
and (structural) causal models.
6.1 AI safety
The incentives of intelligent agents have been a core
concern in AI safety since at least Omohundro (2008)
and Bostrom (2012). A wide range of works, including
works on cooperative inverse RL (Hadfield-Menell et al.,
2016), reward corruption (Everitt et al., 2017), inter-
ruptibility (Soares et al., 2015; Orseau and Armstrong,
2016), oracles (Armstrong et al., 2012), and boxing
(Cohen et al., 2020) have all focused on engineering de-
sirable incentives of various types of AI systems. Our
work aims to put this line of analysis on firmer footing
in the causality and influence diagram literatures.
6.2 Value of information and control
Influence diagrams have long been used to compute the
value of information or control — the degree to which
utility can be gained by setting or observing a vari-
able (Matheson, 1990). Subsequently, graphical criteria
were developed for detecting requisite information links
(Nielsen and Jensen, 1999; Lauritzen and Nilsson, 2001;
Fagiuoli and Zaffalon, 1998), and “relevant” actions
(Nielsen and Jensen, 1999). More recently, Everitt et al.
(2019b) reframed this discussion in terms of agent in-
centives in AI and machine learning and established a
graphical criteria for nodes that would be valuable to
control. Our work offers an important complement, as
it formalizes the incentives shaping the policy of the de-
cision nodes, rather than giving the agent hypothetical
additional observations or decision nodes.
6.3 Influence diagrams and structural
causal models
Variants of structural causal influence models have been
considered previously. A SCIM can be understood as
a functional influence model (Dawid, 2002) augmented
with utility nodes. It can also be viewed as a successor to
the Howard canonical form influence diagram (Howard,
1990; Heckerman and Shachter, 1995). A SCIM requires
all intrinsic nodes, rather than just descendants of the
decision, to be deterministic so deterministic potential
responses may be computed on all intrinsic nodes (not
just descendants of the decision). This feature is instru-
mental in defining response incentives (Definition 8).
7 Conclusion
With the theory of incentives, it is possible to take
a decision-making task, and analyze what behaviours
agents are likely to exhibit. This analysis is indepen-
dent of the agent’s architecture and instead relies on
the agent being sufficiently capable of attaining utility.
Formalizing agent environments and objectives with
structural causal influence models, this paper defined
two types of incentives that shape agent behaviour.
Control incentives inform us of an agent’s instrumental
goals, an important consideration for AI safety. Mean-
while, response incentives indicate which variables an
optimal decision is sensitive to, with implications for al-
gorithmic fairness. Ultimately, we hope that researchers
will find formal incentive analysis useful for designing
fair and safe AI systems.
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A Proofs
A.1 Preliminaries
The proofs rely on some fundamental results from Pearl
(2009).
Definition 13 (Path Interception). Let (X 699K Y |Z)G
stand for the statement “Every directed path from X
to Y in graph G contains at least one element in Z.” G
is omitted if the graph is clear.
Definition 14 (Causal Irrelevance). X is causally ir-
relevant to Y , given Z, written (X 6→ Y |Z) if, for every
set W disjoint of X ∪ Y ∪Z, we have
∀ε, z,x,x′,w Yxzw(ε) = Yx′zw(ε)
Lemma 15. For every model M compatible with a
DAG G,
(X 699K Y |Z)G ⇒ (X 6→ Y |Z)
Proof. By induction over variables, as in
Galles and Pearl (1997, Lemma 12).
Lemma 16. For any disjoint subsets of variables
W ,X,Y ,Z in the DAG G, E(Yx|z,w) = E(Yx|w) if
Y ⊥ Z|(X,W ) in the graph G′ formed by deleting all
incoming edges to X.
Proof. Follows from Pearl (2009), Thm. 3.4.1, Rule 1.
Lemma 17. For any three disjoint subsets of nodes
(X,Y ,Z) in a DAG G, (X ⊥G Y |Z) if and only if
(X ⊥ Y |Z)P for every probability function P compati-
ble with G.
Proof. See Pearl (2009), Theorem 1.2.4
Lemma 18. d-separation obeys the intersection prop-
erty. That is, for all disjoint sets of variables W , X,
Y , and Z,
(W ⊥X|Y ,Z) ∧ (W ⊥ Y |X,Z)
⇒ (W ⊥ (X ∪ Y )|Z)
Proof. Suppose that that the RHS is false, so there is
a path from W to X ∪ Y conditional on Z. This path
must have a sub-path that passes from W to X ∈ X
without passing through Y or to Y ∈ Y without pass-
ing through X (it must traverse one set first). But this
implies that W is d-connected to X given Y ,Z or to
Y given X,Z, meaning the LHS is false. So if the LHS
is true, then the RHS must be true.
A.2 Graphical criteria
Control incentives
Lemma 19 (CI Graphical Criterion Soundness). If a
single-decision CID G does not contain a path of the
form D 99K X 99K U then there is no control incentive
on X in any SCIM M compatible with G.
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Proof. Let M be any SCIM compatible with G and pi
any policy for M. We consider variables in the SCM
Mpi.
If there is no directed path D 99K X 99K U in
G, then either D 699K X or X 699K U . If D 699K X, then
(D 699K X | PaD) as well. By Lemma 15, Xd|paD =
X |paD for any context paD and decision d. There-
fore, U|paD = UXd |paD. Similarly, if X 699K U then
U |paD = Ux|paD for every x ∈ dom(X) and U ∈ U
so U|paD = UXd |paD. In either case, Epi[U | paD] =
Epi[UXd | paD] and there is no control incentive on
X .
Lemma 20 (CI Graphical Criterion Completeness). If
a single-decision CID G contains a path of the form
D 99K X 99K U then there is a control incentive on
X in at least one SCIM M compatible with G.
Proof. Assume that G contains a directed path D =
Z0 → Z1 → · · · → Zn = U where U ∈ U and
Zi = X for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. We prove Lemma 20
by explicitly constructing a compatible SCIM for which
there is a control incentive on X . Consider the model
M = 〈G,E ,F , P 〉 where P is arbitrary, all variables
have domain {0, 1}, and F = {fV | V ∈X ∪U} where
fV (paV , εV ) =
{
Zi−1 if V = Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
0 otherwise
That is, all variables along the path Z0 → . . . → Zn
are set equal to their predecessor (except Z0 = D,
which has no structure function) and all other vari-
ables are set to 0. In this model, U = D ∈ {0, 1}
and all other utility variables are always 0 so the
only optimal policy is pi∗(paD) = 1, which gives
Epi∗ [U | PaD = 0] = 1. Meanwhile, UXd = d so for d = 0
we have Epi∗ [UXd | PaD = 0] = 0.
Response incentive
Lemma 21 (RI Graphical Criterion Soundness). If
a single-decision CID G does not satisfy the response
incentive graphical criterion (D 99K U) ∧ (X 99KW ) ∧
(W ⊥ U |FaD \ {W}) for any U ∈ U , W ∈ PaD then
there is no response incentive on X in any SCIM M
compatible with G.
Proof. Assume that G does not satisfy the response in-
centive graphical criterion on X . Let M be any SCIM
compatible with G and let pi∗ be an optimal policy for
M. We show that there is no response incentive on X
in M by constructing an optimal policy p˜i such that
D(ε) = Dx(ε) for every ε ∈ dom(E) and x ∈ dom(X).
Partition PaD into
PaXD = PaD ∩DescX
PaX¯D = PaD \Pa
X
D
and select any value p˜aXD ∈ dom(Pa
X
D) for which
Prpi∗(Pa
X
D = p˜a
X
D) > 0. Define
p˜i(paXD ,pa
X¯
D , εD) := pi
∗(p˜aXD ,pa
X¯
D , εD).
By design,X is causally irrelevant toD in the SCMMp˜i
so for any x and ε, Dx(ε) = D(ε). All that remains is
to show that p˜i is an optimal policy.
Partition U into UD = U ∩DescD and U
D¯ = U \
DescD. D is causally irrelevant for every U ∈ U D¯ so
every policy pi (in particular, p˜i) is optimal with respect
to UD¯ :=
∑
U∈U D¯ U .
We now consider UD :=
∑
U∈UD U . Since the re-
sponse incentive graphical criterion is not satisfied, it
must be the case that W ⊥ UD | {D} ∪PaD \ {W} for
every W ∈ PaXD . By inductively applying the intersec-
tion property of d-separation over elements of PaXD we
get that PaXD ⊥ U
D | {D} ∪PaX¯D and therefore
PaXD ⊥ U
D | {D} ∪PaX¯D . (2)
Since Prpi(paD) is independent of the policy
pi, we show that Ep˜i [U
D] = Epi∗ [U
D] by show-
ing that Ep˜i[U
D | paD] = Epi∗ [U
D | paD] for every
paD ∈ dom(PaD) with Pr(paD) > 0. First, the ex-
pected utility of p˜i on any paXD is equal to the expected
utility of pi∗ on input p˜aXD :
Ep˜i[U
D | PaXD = pa
X
D ,Pa
X¯
D = pa
X¯
D ]
=
∑
u,d
u Pr(UD = u | d,paXD ,pa
X¯
D)
Prp˜i(D = d | pa
X
D ,pa
X¯
D)
=
∑
u,d
u Pr(UD = u | d, p˜aXD ,pa
X¯
D)
Prpi∗(D = d | p˜a
X
D ,pa
X¯
D)
where the last equality follows from (2) and the defini-
tion of p˜i. Second, the expected utility of pi∗ on input
p˜aXD is the same as its expected utility on any input
paXD :
= Epi∗ [U
D | PaXD = p˜a
X
D ,Pa
X¯
D = pa
X¯
D ]
= max
d
E[UDd | Pa
X
D = p˜a
X
D ,Pa
X¯
D = pa
X¯
D ]
= max
d
E[UDd | Pa
X
D = pa
X
D ,Pa
X¯
D = pa
X¯
D ]
= Epi∗ [U
D | PaXD = pa
X
D ,Pa
X¯
D = pa
X¯
D ]
where the second last equality follows from Lemma 16.
Therefore, p˜i is optimal for UD with Ep˜i[U
D] = Epi∗ [U
D].
Since p˜i is also optimal for UD¯, p˜i is an optimal policy
and so there is no response incentive on X in M.
Lemma 22 (RI Graphical Criterion Completeness).
If a single-decision CID G satisfies the response in-
centive graphical criterion (D 99K U) ∧ (X 99KW ) ∧
(W ⊥ U |FaD \ {W}) for some U ∈ U , W ∈ PaD then
is a response incentive on X in at least one SCIM M
compatible with G.
Proof. Assume that a CID G satisfies the response in-
centive graphical criterion for X with respect to U ∈
U and W ∈ PaD. The variables W and U are d-
connected given FaD \ {W} so there are models in
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which they are conditionally dependent. Consider a (hy-
pothetical) model M, outlined in Figure 7, in which
variables have domain {−1, 0, 1}, X = 1, U = D · Z
for Z ∼ Unif({−1, 1}) and, when conditioning on
PaD \ {W}, W = X · Z · c where c ∈ {−1, 1} is a
function of pa
\W
D ∈ dom(PaD \ {W}). If X and W are
the same node we instead set W = Z · c. In this model,
D = W · c is an optimal policy and yields a utility of
U = X · Z2 · c2 = 1.
Now consider the intervention that sets X = 0 and
consequently WX=0 = 0. Without the information
about Z contained inW , Z is independent of (PaD)X=0
and hence independent of DX=0 regardless of the se-
lected policy. Therefore, Epi[UDX=0 ] = Epi[Z ·DX=0] = 0
for every policy pi. In particular, for any optimal policy
pi∗, Epi∗ [UDX=0 ] 6= Epi∗ [UD] = Epi∗ [U ] = 1 so there must
be some ε such that DX=0(ε) 6= D(ε). Therefore, if this
M exists then there is a response incentive on X .
X
X = 1
WW | pa\W
D
= X · Z · c PaD \ {W}
D
Z
Z ∼ Unif{−1, 1}
UU = D · Z
· · ·
Figure 7: Outline of the variables involved in the re-
sponse incentive model construction. Arrows represent
directed paths and the dotted path d-connects W and
Z given PaD \ {W}. Every graph that satisfies the re-
sponse incentive graphical criterion contains this struc-
ture when allowing X and Z to represent the same vari-
able as W . pi(paD, εD) =W · c is an optimal policy for
the model described by the node labels.
The remainder of this proof consists of explicitly con-
structing the modelM and is similar to the proof of the
observation incentive criterion by Everitt et al. (2019b,
Theorem 18). In G there exists an undirected path
WU = Z0Z1 · · ·Zn that is unblocked given FaD \ W
where Z0 = W and Zn = U . For each Zi, if Zi−1 ←
Zi → Zi+1 then label Zi a “source” node Sl and if
Zi−1 → Zi ← Zi+1 then label it a “collider” node Ol.
By the definition of conditional d-separation, Ol 99K D.
With this labelling, we can write WU as
W
(S0)
O1
S1
· · ·
Om
Sm
U
for m ≥ 0 where the first S0 is optional; we give W
the label S0 if S0 does not otherwise exist. The path
cannot end with Om L99 U because there is a directed
path Om 99K D 99K U in G so the existence of a path
U 99K Om would create a cycle. Therefore, Sm always
exists although it may be the case that Sm = W when
m = 0.
We constructM = 〈G,E ,F , P 〉 as follows: The exoge-
nous variables E have domain {−1, 1} and P gives each
an independent uniform distribution. The decision and
utility variables have domain {−1, 0, 1} and all other
variables have domain {−1, 0, 1}
m+4
. Conceptually, we
would like each variable to have domain {−1, 0, 1} but
we need to define the functional structure along many
possibly intersecting paths so we define each path struc-
ture in its own dimension. For a variable V ∈ V and a
structure function fV , we write
V = (V ∗, V
−−→
XW , V
−−→
DU , VWU , V
−−→
O1D, . . . , V
−−−→
OmD)
fV = (f
∗
V , f
−−→
XW
V , f
−−→
DU
V , f
WU
V , f
−−→
O1D
V , . . . , f
−−−→
OmD
V )
where V ∗ is the canonical dimension that encodes the
values described in the previous outline ofM (and also
refers to the sole dimension of D and U), V
−−→
AB is used
for the directed path A 99K B, and V AB is used for the
undirected path A -- B. For each dimension of the form
−−→
AB, let A = Y0 → Y1 → · · · → Yn = B be a path in G
and define
f
−−→
AB
V (paV , εV ) =


Y ∗0 if V = Y1
Y
−−→
AB
i−1 if V = Yi, 2 ≤ i ≤ n
0 otherwise
for V ∈ X ∪ U . Since utilities have scalar domain, we
don’t include f
−−→
AB
U in the model, only f
∗
U , but it is help-
ful to define f
−−→
AB
U in order to refer to it later. With these
structure functions, B
−−→
AB = f
−→
AB
B (paB, εB) = A
∗ when-
ever n ≥ 1.
Along the WU dimension, define
fWUV (paV , εV )
=


ZWUi−1 if V = Zi, Zi−1 → Zi → Zi+1
ZWUi+1 if V = Zi, Zi−1 ← Zi ← Zi+1
ZWUi−1 · Z
WU
i+1 if V = Zi, Zi−1 → Zi ← Zi+1
εV if V = Zi, Zi−1 ← Zi → Zi+1
εV if V = Z0, Z0 → Z1
0 otherwise
for V ∈ X ∪U . This gives us
SWUl ∼ Unif({−1, 1})
OWUl = S
WU
l−1 · S
WU
l .
Finally, we define the structure functions for the
canonical dimension:
f∗U (paU , εU ) = f
−−→
DU
U (paU , εU ) · f
WU
U (paU , εU )
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which implies U = D · SWUm , and
f∗W (paW , εW ) =


f
−−→
XW
W (paW , εW )
· fWUW (paW , εW )
if X 6=W
fWUW (paW , εW ) otherwise
f∗X(paX , εX) = 1 if X 6=W
f∗V (paV , εV ) = 0 for all other V ∈ V \ {U,W,X}
meaning W ∗ = X∗ · SWU0 if X 6=W and W
∗ = SWU0 if
X =W .
This construction matches the desired structure of
M where Z = SWUm and c =
∏
lO
WU
l = S
WU
0 S
WU
m .
Note that the value of OWUl is represented in Pa
−−→
OlD
D
via the path Ol 99K D so c is indeed a function of PaD.
Therefore, there is a response incentive on X inM.
A.3 Counterfactual fairness
Proof of Theorem 12. Assume that there exists an
optimal policy pi that is counterfactually fair. Let
supppi(D | paD) = {d | Prpi(D = d | paD) > 0} and
supppi(Da | paD) = {d | Prpi(Da = d | paD) > 0}. As a
first step, we will show that for any ε ∈ dom(E) and
any intervention a on A,
supppi
(
D | PaD(ε)
)
= supppi
(
Da | PaD(ε)
)
. (3)
By way of contradiction, suppose there exist a decision
d ∈ supppi
(
D | PaD(ε)
)
\ supppi
(
Da | PaD(ε)
)
. (4)
Since d ∈ supppi
(
D | PaD(ε)
)
, we have
Prpi (D = d | PaD(ε), A(ε)) > 0. (5)
And since d 6∈ supppi
(
Da | PaD(ε)
)
, there exists no ε′
with positive probability such that PaD(ε
′) = PaD(ε),
A(ε′) = A(ε), and Da(ε
′) = d, which gives
Prpi (Da = d | PaD(ε), A(ε)) = 0. (6)
Equations (5) and (6) violate the counterfactual fair-
ness property (1), which shows that (4) is impossible.
An analogous argument shows that d ∈ supppi
(
Da |
PaD(ε)
)
\ supppi
(
D | PaD(ε)
)
also violates the coun-
terfactual fairness property (1). We have thereby estab-
lished (3).
Select now an arbitrary ordering of the elements of
dom(D) and define a new policy pi∗ such that pi∗(paD)
is the minimal element of supppi(D | paD). Then pi
∗ is
optimal because pi is optimal. Further, pi∗ will make
the same decision in decision contexts PaD(ε) and
(PaD)a(ε) because of (3). In other words,Da(ε) = D(ε)
in Mpi∗ for the optimal policy pi
∗, which means that
there is no response incentive on A.
Now we prove the reverse direction — that if there
is no response incentive then some optimal pi∗ is coun-
terfactually fair. Choose any optimal policy pi∗ where
Da(ε) = D(ε) for all ε. Since an intervention a cannot
change D in any setting, P (Da = d | ·) = P (D = d | ·)
for any condition and any decision d, hence pi∗ is coun-
terfactually fair.
12
